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Abstract: Using a survey approach, this paper examines the perceptions of managers of dividend-paying 
firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) on factors influencing dividend policy, issues relating dividend 
policy and the corporate governance practices. The survey shows that the most important factors that affect 
dividend policy are; the level of current earnings, the projection about the future state of the economy, the 
stockholders characteristics, concerns about the stock prices, need of current stockholders. From a practical 
perspective, there is little discrimination among the top ranked factors. All the surveyed firms formulate their 
dividend policies according the theoretical model of Lintner (1956). The survey also shows that there is no 
difference in responses about these factors with respect to various titles of the respondents such as chief 
financial officer or Chief Exceptive Officer. The survey also finds strong support for the life cycling theory 
followed by agency theory, signaling theory and the catering theory respectively. The survey also shows the 
presence of corporate governance practices in the surveyed firms. 
 
Keywords: Dividend Policy, Factors affecting dividend policy, Issues relating dividend Policy, Corporate 
governance. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The behavior of corporations paying cash dividends to their shareholders is a matter of considerable interest 
to financial economists. Dividend policy has been a controversial topic in the literature of finance. Brealey and 
Myers (2002) list dividends as one of the ten unresolved issues in finance. The dividend policy is the payout 
policy that managers follow in deciding the size and pattern of cash distribution to shareholders over time. 
Payment of dividends has been described as just like a puzzle (Black, 1976).  Over the past three decades, a 
substantial amount of attention has been directed toward the identification of the determinants of dividend 
policy. Researchers follow a divergent path in identifying factors which affect the dividend policy. Some take a 
normative approach and developed various theories how firms should make their dividends policy decisions. 
Most of these models are economic and don’t take into consideration the emotions and perceptions of 
mangers. Others follow the behavioral approach in which they went to mangers and asked them how they 
designed their dividend policies. Comparing the responses from various surveys to theoretical models 
provided a way whether managers make dividend decisions consistent with the theoretical models. 
According to Allen and Michaely (1995), more theoretical and empirical work is required before a consensus 
can be reached. The present study aims to know about the perceptions and of managers and their effects on 
dividend payment in companies which are listed in Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). The motivation comes 
from the fact that only 35 percent of the firms are paying dividend in Pakistani listed firms. In developing 
markets cash dividends are preferable by small shareholders because they rely on dividends for their 
consumption purposes. The firms are unable to attract funds from the shareholders unless they pay dividend. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SECP) is in the process of revising the Corporate Governance Code, it is 
good idea to investigate the perception of managers who are the main decision makers regarding dividend 
policy. 
 
The present study contributes to the existing literature because it updates and expands the previous 
surveyed based studies for an emerging market. This is first study based on primary data for investigating the 
dividend policy from the firm’s perspective for Pakistan. A little work has been done on the divided policy 
based on the secondary data and focus is to test whether theoretical model holds for Pakistani case (Ahmad & 
Javid, 2009). The study provides new evidences from managers of Pakistani firms on dividend policy 
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including the parameters of corporate governance especially the board effectiveness. The study inquires 
managers their perceptions about several issues regarding dividend policy which are not explicitly addressed 
in various studies in this context.  
 
The main focus is to identify the most important factors effecting dividend decisions by Pakistani companies 
that are traded on Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE). The study attempts to know about the manager’s views on 
residual dividend policy, dividend policy and firm’s value, dividend process and patterns. The study examines 
whether there are differences among the manager’s views on various factors and issues involving dividend 
policy and how they are linked with different theories on this issue. It is investigated that the firm’s dividend 
policy is influenced by corporate governance practices.  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. 
The second section provides review of theoretical and empirical literature on the dividend policy. Section 
three describes the data and variables used in the analysis, model of dividends and estimation method. The 
results are discussed in section five and section six offers conclusions. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Over the past three decades, a substantial amount of attention has been directed towards the identification of 
the determinants of corporate dividend policy. Since the publication of Miller and Modigliani (1961) papers 
showing that in perfect and complete markets, financial managers cannot alter the value of their firms by 
changing their dividend policy. In the real world, however, markets are less than perfect. So, dividend policy 
has been a controversial topic in the literature of finance. As a result, researchers have proposed different 
theories about the factors which influence the dividend decisions of the firms. The empirical research into 
dividend policy can be broadly categorized into two types: studies that have examined the relevance of the 
specific dividend based hypotheses and studies that have sought to identify corporate characteristics that 
influence dividend policy and the associated hypotheses. The first type is further classified into capital 
markets based research and survey analyses to examine dividend relevance.  
 
Researchers have proposed many different theories about the factors that influence a firm’sdividend policy. 
Although numerous theories, models, and explanations exist, most broad and commonly used theories 
includes: Bird-in-the-hand theory given by Gordon (1963) and Walter (1963) argues that investors prefer 
cash in the hand rather than a future promise of capital gains due to lower risk. Dividends mitigate 
information asymmetry between management and shareholders by conveying private information about a 
firm’s future prospects called signaling explanation of dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979, John & Williams, 1985). 
Tax preference and clientele effects theory that explains differentials in tax rates between dividends and 
capital gains lead to different clienteles (Elton & Gruber, 1970; Miller & Scholes, 1978). Agency theory argues 
that dividends help to reduce the agency costs associated with the separation of ownership and control 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984). Life-cycle theory postulates dividend policy 
tends to follow a firm’s life-cycle and reflects management’s assessment of the importance of market 
imperfections including taxes to equity-holders, agency costs, asymmetric information, flotation costs, and 
transactions costs (Lease et al. 2000, Fama & French, 2001), and Catering theory argues that managers give 
investors what they currently want, that is, they cater to investor demand by paying dividends when 
investors put a stock price premium on payers, and by not paying when investors prefer non payers (Baker & 
Wurgler, 2004a,b). 
 
Studies looking into corporate characteristics that influence dividend policy primarily use the capital markets 
based approach and the empirical results are mixed. The mixed evidence suggests that individual companies 
adopt specific dividend strategies to suit their specific circumstances. A number of factors have been 
identified in empirical studies the influence of the dividend policy decisions of the firm. To, enumerate a few,  
profitability, risk, cash flows, agency cost,growth, taxes, price earnings ratio etc. are most important. Pruitt 
and Gitman (1991) find that risk (year to year variability of earnings) also determine the firms’ dividend 
policy. A firm that has relatively stable earnings is often more likely to pay a higher percentage of its earnings 
than firm with fluctuating earnings. In other studies, Rozeff (1982), Lloyd et al. (1985) and Collins et al. 
(1996) suggests that firms having higher level of market risk will payout dividends at lower rate. D’Souza 
(1999) also finds statistically significant and negative relationship between beta and dividend payout. The 
liquidity or cash flows position is also an important determinant of dividend payouts. A poor liquidity 
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position means less generous dividends due to shortage of cash. Alli et al. (1993) reveal that dividend 
payments depend more on cash flows, which reflect the company’s ability to pay dividends, than on current 
earnings, which are less heavily influenced by accounting practices. They claim current earnings don’t really 
reflect the firm’s ability to pay dividends. Green et al. (1993) show that dividend decision is taken along with 
investment and financing decisions. The results however do not support the views of Miller and Modigliani 
(1961). Partington (1983) finds that firms use target payout ratios. Firms’ motives for paying dividends and 
extent to which dividends are determined are independent of investment policy. Higgins (1981) indicates a 
direct link between growth and financing needs: rapidly growing firms have external financing needs because 
working capital needs normally exceed the incremental cash flows from new sales. Higgins (1972) shows that 
payout ratios are negatively related to firms’ need top fund finance growth opportunities. Rozeff (1982); 
Lloyd et al. (1985); Collins et al. (1996) documented significantly negative relationship between historical 
sales growth and dividend payout.  
 
Survey analysis is an alternative method to examine dividend relevance. Lintner (1956) conduct a classic 
study on how U.S. managers make dividend decisions by developing a compact mathematical model based on 
survey of 28 U.S. firms. The results indicate that dividend payment pattern of a firm is influenced by the 
current year earnings and previous year dividends. Baker, Farrelly and Edelman (1985) survey 318 New York 
stock exchange firms and conclude that the major determinants of dividend payments are anticipated level of 
future earnings and pattern of past dividends. The results show that dividend policy has implications for the 
market value of firms. Managers are concerned primarily with the signaling implications of dividends, though 
they also recognize the role of a residual policy for future investment opportunities. Baker and Powell (1999) 
and Baker et al. (2002) used data of firms quoted on the NYSE and NASDAQ, respectively. They confirm the 
signaling and residual role of dividends and suggest that respondents appear to be uncertain about the bird in 
hand theory and while they acknowledge the implications of the different tax statuses of investors, they are 
unsure of how to respond. There are few differences in the opinions of managers, based on the stock 
exchange listing of the firms. Adjaoud (1986) finds that Canadian dividend-paying firms try to maintain stable 
dividends per share. Firms are reluctant to decrease the payout level, and smoothly adjust the level of payout 
based on level of expected future earnings. Jog and Srivastava (1994) find that dividend decisions by 
Canadian firms depend heavily on the current and future predictability of dividends, the past pattern of 
dividends, and the availability of cash while Jong et al. (2003) find that payout ratios of Canadian firms are 
determined by free cash flow. 
 
The dividend issue is not seriously investigated in Pakistan. The study by Ahmad and Javid (2009) 
investigates various theoretical models based on 320 manufactured companies applying the panel data for 
the period 2000 to 2006: Lintner (1956) partial adjustment model is supported implying that firms prefer 
smooth dividend policy. Overall, a large body of research into the influence of corporate variables on dividend 
policy is dominated by the markets based approach. The results are mix, the number of variables examined is 
also relatively limited, and focus is on one specific hypothesis viz. dividend hypothesis. A survey based 
analysis provides results from a different perspective and also looks into the holistic effect of the corporate 
characteristics on dividend policy. It might be interesting to find out what factors determine the dividend 
decision from firms perspective in Pakistani manufacturing sector. 
 
3. Methodology and Data 
 
Data: The data is collected through a survey of 40 manufacturing firms from Karachi in 2010. The 
questionnaire designed by Baker and Powel (2000) and Baker et al. (2001) is adopted for this purpose. This 
questionnaire is modified according to our corporate environment and extended by including some variables 
that denote corporate governance. The questions are added regarding corporate governance practices 
especially the board effectiveness where dividend decisions are made. The board size, CEO duality, 
independent managers on the board and independent audit committee are corporate governance variables 
included in the study.1The questionnaires are filled from those respondents who are knowledgeable 
                                               
1 Board composition captures board autonomy, structure and effectiveness variables. The separation of role of CEO 
and chair dilutes the power of CEO and increases board’s ability to properly execute the oversight judgment. It also 
critically evaluates executive directors and the presence of non-executive member on board and reduces the 
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individuals, actively involved in the formulation of the dividend policies of their firms and almost all survey 
respondents hold senior managerial positions,which, in turn, lends credibility to the results of the study .All 
manufacturing firms which are listed on Karachi Stock Exchange (100) are included in the population. We 
circulated 130 questionnaires out of which we received response from 40 questionnaires. This is a response 
rate of 32%. The sample is confined to the number of companies which are accessible and who are agreed to 
provide the data. Therefore, the completed 40 questionnaires from 40 various manufacturing firms is 
compiled.  The questionnaires to different firms are sent through mail but all of them did not respond back.  
 
The questionnaire used in this research consists of three parts. The first part includes some 22 factors as 
determinants of dividend policy. Here a four point scale has been used, where 0 = no importance, 1 = low 
importance, 2 = moderate importance and 3 = high importance. The second part of the questionnaire contains 
some information about the demographics and corporate governance practice adopted by these firms. The 
last part of the questionnaire consists of 27 statements (which is referred as A1 to A27). Five points scale has 
been where -2= strongly disagree, -1= disagree, 0= no opinion, 1= agree, 2= strongly agree. 
 
Analytical Framework: The mean scores are calculated for each factor and statement and then arranged 
them from top to bottom. The t-test is used for the null hypothesis that the mean responses for each 22 
factors influencing dividend policy are equal to zero. The analysis is also done by ANOVA to know whether 
there is difference in responses of people with respect to their managerial positions. 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
 
This section reports the survey results in four sub-sections. First, the responses to several questions about 
the respondents and their firm’s dividend policy are examined. Thefactors influencing dividend policy for 
Pakistani firms are discussed next. Third, theresponses to statements about management preferences, 
dividend setting process, dividend policy and value are explored. Finally, the study investigates whether there 
are differences in responses to various factors depending upon the repondents’s title. 
  
Descriptive Statistics: The survey also contains several background questions about the firm’s existing 
dividend policy. Table 1 displays the responses to three questions about the administration of dividend 
policy. As regards whom is the most influential person in developing the firm’s dividend policy, the results 
reported in Table 1 show that 78% of the respondents selected the CEO, 10 % selected CFO while 13.5% 
answered about the combined effects of both CEO and CFO2. In response to question how often does your firm 
formally reexamine its dividend policy.Out the of respondents 82% responded that they annually form their 
dividend policies, 2.5% from 1-2 years, 12.5% from 1-3 years and 2.5% form their dividend policy from 1-4 
years. In response to the question, the firm has an explicit target payout ratio; 20% of respondents answered 
in yes about the presence of target payout ratio, 37.5% answered no and while 42.5% don’t know about their 
target payout ratio. The responding firms represent various industries of which the most common 
industrytype is manufacturing, 92% responded from manufacturing, 5% from trading and 2.5% from other 
organizations. Of all the respondents, their positions are as follows: company secretary (10%), CEO (2.5%), 
CFO (17.5%), financial analysts (5%) and Managers (65%).  
 
As regards the governance practices adopted by these firms in all of the firms surveyed have independent 
directors on their boards, the role of CEO is different from CFO, and the remuneration of the CEO is salary 
based. Of these respondents 97% tell that independent audit is conducted while 2.5% answered in no. All 
these firms on average have 8 directors on their boards. 
                                                                                                                                                       
influence of management on the board. Moreover a higher proportion of outside directors and independent audit 
committee increase monitoring and increase the performance of the firms ( Shaw, 1981). The CEO may find a 
smaller board more easily dominated and more manageable due to the potential for social cohesion. On the other 
hand if the board is large, its independence is increased in the sense that the CEO’s ability to influence is diluted and 
it is more difficult for the CEO to dominate the board. Therefore board size should be reasonable enough to manage. 
This study has firms with board size more than eight. 
2
The CFO is most influential for Norwegian firms (Baker, Muhkarjee & Paskelian, 2005), but the CEO occupies this 
role for U.S. firms. (Baker & Powell, 2000; Baker, Veit, & Powell, 2001). 
 67 
 
  
Table 1:  Background Information 
A. Who is most influential in developing the dividend policy ultimately approved by board of 
directors 
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 78%  
Chief Executive Office (CEO) 10%  
Both CEO and CFO 13.5%  
B. How often does your firm formally reexamine its dividend policy? 
1    year 82%  
1-2 years 2.5%  
1-3 years 12.5%  
1-4 years 2.5%  
C. Does your firm have an explicit target payout ratio? 
 Yes No 
Presence of target payout Ratio 20% 37.5% 
D. Corporate Governance 
 Yes No 
CEO CFO Split 100%  
Independent Directors 100%  
Independent Audit Committee 97% 2.5% 
Board Size 8 or More than 8  
 
 Factors that Affect Dividend Policies: This study addresses the question about what are the most 
important factors influencing the dividend policies from the view of policymakers. Table 2 provides the result 
of the most important factors that affect the dividend policies of dividend paying firms listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE). The Table reports the results of 22 factors that are ranked based on their mean scores. The 
study focuses on the top five and the lowest five factors (based on their highest and lowest mean scores). As it 
is clear from the Table 2, the most important factors affecting the dividend policies of the dividend paying 
firms listed on Karachi Stock Exchange are: the level of current earnings, the projection about the future state 
of the economy, the stockholders characteristics, concerns about the stock prices, need of current 
stockholders. All these top five ranked factors are highly significant at the 0.01 level. The managers rank the 
level of current earnings at the top3. Current earnings give rise to cash flows which are used to pay dividends. 
Uncertainty and previous impacts of depression give high rank to the projection about the future state of the 
economy. From a practical perspective, there is little discrimination among the top ranked factors (from 2.55 
to 2.37). While the five factors which are ranked lowest are: current degree of financial leverage, desire to 
maintain in the long run a given fraction of earnings, contractual constraints, preferences to pay dividends 
instead of taking risky investments, desire to avoid giving a false signal by changing the dividend policy. All 
these lowest ranked factors are significant at the 0.01 level. The rationale behind low rank given to current 
degree of financial leverage is major chunk of debt has been uphold by the government and very little is left 
over to the corporate sector. The interest rates are very high which limits these companies to obtain loans on 
large scales. In short, the only apparent differences appear at the extremes and these are not very large 
because more than 85% of the respondents, even for the factors with the lowest means, given them of 
moderate to high importance. In general, it is concluded that few differences appear in the importance among 
the various factors.  
 
Issues Related Dividend Policy: This section discusses the view about corporate dividend policy by 
providing the respondents ‘opinion about statement relating to dividend policy in general. Table 3 shows the 
results of the surveyed KSE listed firms on dividend issues such as residual dividend policy, dividend policy 
and firm value, dividend process and patterns etc. In most of the cases, the results are discussed as the 
percentage of responses that express agreement (both strongly agree and agree) because this is more 
appealing way to interpret the results rather than the mean scores. Panel A of Table 3 shows the managers 
                                               
3 Previous studies also confirm this association (Pruit & Gitman, 1991, Baker et al. 2001, Baker, Sade & Gandhi, 
2007,  Mullah, 2009). Ahamad & Javid, 2009 also confirm this for Pakistan.  
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views on the life cycle theory of dividends. Out of the total respondents 97.5 % agree that the dividends 
payments of a firm changes over its life cycle of a business. 
 
Table 2:  Level of Importance Attached to Factors Influencing Dividend Policy by Managers of KSE-
Listed Firms 
  Level of Importance %  
Factor N None  
0 
Low 
 1 
Mod 
2 
High 
3 
Mean 
Level of current earnings 40 0 0 45 55 2.55 
Projection about the future  state of the 
economy 
40 0 2.5 45 52 2.50 
Stockholders characteristics 40 0 2.5 50 47.5 2.45 
Concern about the stock price 40 0 0 55 45 2.45 
Need of current stockholders 40 0 5 47.5 47.5 2.42 
Legal rules about dividends 40 0 7.5 47.5 40 2.37 
Signaling incentives 40 0 7.5 50 42.5 2.35 
Stability of earnings 40 0 5 57.5 37.5 2.33 
Desire to maintain target capital structure 40 0 7.5 52.5 40 2.32 
Desire to confirm to industry payout ratio 40 0 12.5 45 42.5 2.30 
Desire to confirm to industry payout ratio 40 0 12.5 45 42.5 2.30 
Availability of alternative source of capital 40 0 15 42.5 42.5 2.27 
Investment considerations 40 0 7.5 57.5 35 2.27 
Liquidity constraints 40 0 15 45 40 2.25 
Financing considerations such as external 
source of capital 
40 0 12.5 50 37.5 2.25 
Pattern of past dividends 40 0 0 77.5 22.5 2.22 
Level of expected future earnings 40 0 0 77.5 22.5 2.22 
Current degree of financial leverages 40 0 2.5 72.5 25.0 2.22 
Desire to maintain in the long run a given 
fraction of earnings 
40 0 10 57.5 32.5 2.22 
Contractual constraints 40 2.5 5 60 32.5 2.22 
Preferences to pay dividend instead of taking 
risky investments 
40 2.5 7.5 57.5 32.5 2.20 
Desire to avoid giving a false signal by 
changing the dividend policy 
40 0 12.5 57.5 30 2.17 
Expected rate of return on the firm assets 40 0 15 55 30 2.15 
 
The level of agreement is significantly different from zero at 1% level. It is clear that these firms make 
changes in their dividend policies at various levels of their business cycles. These results are in line with the 
findings of Baker et al. (2001), Coulten & Ruddock (2009). Panel B of Table 3 shows the agreement of 
managers on four statements on dividend policy and firm’s value. Almost 100% of the respondents agree on 
the statement, dividends affect the cost of capital, 97.5% respondents agree on the statement, changes in 
dividend policy affect the firm value, 89% respondents agree on the statement, dividend policy should 
increase the shareholder value while 92.5% respondents agree on the statement, firms should maintain 
balance between future growth needs and current dividend payments. All these four statements are 
significant at 1% level. Unlike Miller & Modigliani (1963) claim that dividend policy has no effect on firm 
value in perfect markets, the market in the study is imperfect and hence the dividend policy is relevant. 
 
 Panel C of Table 3 shows agreements about two statements on residual dividend policy,  92.5% of the 
respondents agree on the statement, expenditures on new plants and equipment’s affect the dividend policy, 
while 95% respondents agree on the statement, dividend is seen as residual. These two statements are 
significant at 1% level. It means that the study support the residual explanation of dividend policy. Panel I of 
Table 4 contains one statement about the Catering Theory of dividends payments, 65% of the respondents 
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agree on the statement, firm’s responsiveness to the preferences of its shareholders and the mean score is 
statistically significant at 1% level. These results indicate that while formulating their dividend policies these 
companies take into considerations the preferences of their shareholders. These findings support the results 
of Neves and Torre (2003). Panel H of Table 4 shows two statements about agency theory, 92.5% of the 
respondents agree on the statement, payment of dividends encourages a manager to work in the best interest 
of company, 90% respondents agree on the statement, payment of dividend forces a firm to external 
financing. The mean scores are statistically different from zero at 1 % level. It reveals that managers perceive 
dividends payments as an instrument to reduce the agency cost problems on one hand reduce transaction 
costs on the other hand. These findings are consistent with the findings of Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984).  
 
Panel J of Table 4 shows the agreement on two statements about the dividend pattern. Almost 100% 
respondents agree on the statement, dividend follow a smoother path than the earnings, while 95% 
respondents agree on the statement, dividend changes generally lag changes in earnings. The means of both 
the statements is significantly different from zero at 1% level. This result is in conformity with earlier 
findings for Pakistan (Ahmad & Javid, 2009) and with the evidence for other markets (Lintner, 1956; Baker, 
Saadi & Gandhi, 2007). Panel k of Table 5 shows agreements on four statements about the signaling theory of 
dividend policy. 97.5% of the respondents agree on the statement, a stock price falls with unexpected 
increase in dividends, 92.5% respondents agree on the statement, dividends changes is considered as a signal 
about the future prospects, 80 % respondents agree on the statement, adequate disclosure of reasons about 
the changes in dividends, while 87.5% agree on the statement, stock value decreases when dividends is 
unexpectedly increased. These findings are in line with the findings of Dhanani (2005). 
 
Panel M of Table 5 presents the agreement on five statements about the dividend process based on Lintner 
(1956) model.  Almost 82% respondents agree on the statement, a firm should not increase dividends if it 
reverses in a year or so, 95% respondents agree on the statement, a firm should keep up uninterrupted 
records of dividends payments, 92% respondents agree on the statement, market places greater value on the 
stocks of stable dividend paying firms, 95% respondents agree on the statement,  target payout ratio and 
adjustment to this ratio, 95% respondents agree on the statement, dividend changes lag behind changes in 
earnings. All these statements are significant at 1 % level. The results indicate that mangers of KSE listed 
firms formulate their dividend policies consistent with the Lintner model (1956). Our results support the 
findings of Lintner (1956), Pruitt & Gitman (1991), Baker, Veit & Powel (2001), Baker, Saadi & Gandhi (2007) 
and Mollah (2009). 
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Table 3: Level of Agreement by Manager of KSE-listed Firms on Explanation for Dividends 
   Level of agreement (%)   
S# Statement N Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree No 
Opinion 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
t-stat Mean 
   -2 -1 0 +1 +2   
Panal A. Life cycle theory 
L1 Changes in dividend over life 
cycle 
40 0 0 0 25 72.5 24.615** 1.74 
Panel B. Dividend Policy and Firm value 
V1 Dividends affect the cost of 
capital 
40 0 0 0 42.5 57.5 19.897** 1.57 
V2 Changes in dividend policy 
affect firm value 
40 0 0 2.5 40 57.5 17.747** 1.55 
V3 Dividend policy should 
increase shareholders value 
40 0 7.5 10 37.5 52.5 13.350** 1.42 
V4 Balance between future 
growth needs and current 
payment 
40 0 2.5 5 50 42.5 12.078** 1.32 
Panel C. Residual Dividend Policy 
R1 Expenditures on new plants  
affect the dividend pattern 
40 0 2.5 5 42.5 50 12.490** 1.40 
R2 Dividends is seen as a 
residual 
40 0 0 5 62.5 32.5 14.552** 1.27 
R1 Expenditures on new plants  
affect the dividend pattern 
40 0 2.5 5 42.5 50 12.490** 1.40 
R2 Dividends is seen as a 
residual 
40 0 0 5 62.5 32.5 14.552** 1.27 
Panel D. Dividend Process 
D1 Dividends generally follow a 
smoother path than earnings. 
40 0 0 0 70 30 17.716** 1.30 
D2 Dividend changes generally 
lag earnings changes. 
40 0 2.5 2.5 72.5 22.5 9.348** 1.10 
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Table 4: Level of Agreement by Manager of KSE-listed Firms on Explanation for Dividends 
   Level of agreement (%)   
          
S# Statement  Strongly 
Disagree 
 
Disagree No 
Opinion 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
t-stat Mean 
  N -2 -1 0 +1 +2   
Panel H. Agency Theory 
A1 Payment of dividends encourages a 
manager to act in the best interest of the 
company 
4
0 
0 2.5 5 32.5 60 13.248** 1.50 
A2 Payment of dividend forces a firm to 
external financing 
4
0 
0 5 5 60 30 9.888** 1.15 
Panel I. Catering Theory 
C1 Firm  responsiveness to the preference of 
its shareholders 
4
0 
0 0 15 50 35 11.049** 1.20 
Panel J. Dividend Pattern 
D1 Dividends generally follow a smoother path 
than earnings. 
4
0 
0 0 0 70 30 17.716** 1.30 
D2 Dividend changes generally lag earnings 
changes. 
4
0 
0 2.5 2.5 72.5 22.5 9.348** 1.10 
*, ** Significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Table 5: Level of Agreement by Manager of KSE-listed Firms on Explanation for Dividends 
   Level of agreement (%)   
S# Statement N Strong
ly 
Disagr
ee 
Disagree No 
Opinion 
Agree Strongly 
Agree 
t-stat Mean 
   -2 -1 0 +1 +2   
Panel K. Signaling Theory 
S1 A stock price falls with unexpected 
increase in dividends 
40 0 7.5 2.5 45 52.5 17.103** 1.50 
S2 Dividend changes is considered as a 
signal about future prospects 
40 0 7.5 7.5 35 57.5 14.811** 1.50 
S3 Adequate disclosure of reason about 
changes in dividends 
40 0 7.5 12.5 37.5 42.5 7.895** 1.15 
S4 Stock value increases when dividends 
are unexpectedly increased. 
40 0 2.5 10 62.5 25 10.356** 1.10 
Panel L. A Bird in the hand Theory 
 Preference to pay dividends instead of 
risky investments. 
 40       0         0      2.5        7.5         57.5          20.257**        2.20 
Panel M. Dividend Process 
D
p1 
A firm should not increase regular 
dividends if it reverses it in a year or 
so. 
 40       0         0      12.5        32.5           50           11.973**         1.39 
*, ** Significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively 
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Differences in Responses with Respect to Respondent’s Title: In order to see whether there are 
differences in responses to various factors with respondent with different titles, one way ANOVA is 
calculated. The result reported in Table 7 shows that the F statistic value is 0.890 which is highly insignificant 
at 5 percent level. This reveals that there are no significant differences in responses to the dividend affecting 
factors with respect to various positions.  
 
Table 6:  Differences with regard to Factors affecting Dividend policy with Respect to various 
positions 
ANOVA 
Current position Sum of squares Df Mean Squares F Sig. 
Between Groups 15.254 9 1.695 0.890 0.545 
Within Groups 57.121 30 1.904   
Total 72.375 39    
 
 
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study shows the perceptions of managers of dividends paying Pakistani firms listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange (KSE) about factors influencing dividend policy, issues relating dividend policy and corporate 
governance practices. According to the perceptions of these managers, the most important factors which 
affect dividend policy are as under: the level of current earnings, the projection about the future state of the 
economy, the stockholders characteristics, concerns about the stock prices, need of current stockholders. 
There is no difference in responses to the factors affecting dividend policy with respect to respondent title. 
From the practical perspective, the findings conclude that few differences appear in the importance among 
the various factors. The perceptions of the managers show that all of them formulate their dividend policies 
consistent with the theoretical model of Lintner (1956).  The study suggests that managers of KSE listed firms 
in general show greatest support for the life cycle theory followed by agency theory, catering theory, signaling 
theory and residual theory respectively. The study also suggests that all the surveyed firms follow the 
corporate governance practices.   
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